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THE ADOPTION OF THE COMMON LAW BY THE
0
AMERICAN COLONIES.
THE most casual student of the jurisprudence of the several
states comprising the Federal Union will observe that our whole
system is predicated upon a body of laws not found in any books
published on this side of the Atlantic; and a consideration of our
colonial history points to the quarter in which this basis of our
laws is to be found.
In State v. Oampbell, T. U. P. Charlton (Ga.) 166, we find the
following remark: "When the American Colonies were first settled by our ancestors it was held, as well by the settlers, as by the
judges and lawyers of England, that they brought hither as a
birthright and inheritance so much of the common law as was applicable to their local situation, and change of circumstances."
This is in accordance with what was said in 2 P. Wins. 75, where
the following memorandum is found, "9th August 1722, it was
said by the Master of the Rolls to have been determined by the
Lords of the Privy Council upon an appeal to the King in council
from the foreign plantations, 1st, that if there be a new and uninhabited country found out by English subjects, as the law is the
birthright of every subject, so wherever they go they carry their
laws with them, and, therefore, such new-found country is to be
governed by the laws of England, though after such country is
inhabited by the English, Acts of Parliament made in England
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without naming the foreign plantations will not bind them." 1
Blackst. 107, recognises the same principle, but falls into the curious error of treating the American plafitations as a conquered
nation, having pre-existing laws of its own, and that, therefore, the
common law has no allowance or authority there,, being subject to
the control of Parliament, though not bound by any Acts of Parliament unless particularly named. Chancellor KENT, 1 Com. 472,
says, "The common law so far as it is applicable to our situation
and government has been recognised an'd adopted as one entire
system by the Constitutions of Massachusetts, New York, New
Jersey and Maryland. It has been assumed by the courts of.justice or declared by statute, with the like modifications, as the law
of the land, in every s~ate. It was imported by our colonial ancestors, as far as it was applicable, anil was sanctioned by *royalcharters and colonial statutes. It is also the established doctrine that
English statutes passed before the emigration of our ancestors, and
applicable to our situation, and in amendment of the law constitute
a part of the common law of this country."
Though these are correct statements of the general principle, the

subject is of sufficient importance to merit a more extended discussion of the cases which have arisen in the application of the principle.
I. In the first place, it is to be noticed that the whole body of
the common law, existing in England at the date of the settlement
of the colonies, was not transplanted, but only so much as was
applicable to the colonists in their new relations and conditions.
Much of the common law related to matters which were purely
local, which existed under the English political organization, or was
based upon the triple relation of king, lords and commons, or those
peculiar social conditions, habits and customs which have no counterpart in the New World. Such portions of the common law, not
being applicable to the new conditions of the colonists, were never
recognised as part of their jurisprudence.
But notwithstanding these exceptions, which are always admitted
when a good reason is shown for so doing, the presumption in every
case is, that the common law is the same in this country, as it was
in the country of its origin, and the inapplicability of any particular portion of it must be shown before such portion will be exscinded from the whole body.
In Wilford v. Grant, Kirby's Rep. (Conn.) 114 (this is the ear-
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liest volume of American reports), we have the following statement,
"The common law of England we are to pay great deference to,
as being a general system of improved i-eason, and a source from
whence our principles of jurisprudence have been mostly drawn.
The rules, however, which have not been made our own by adoption we are to examine, and so far vary from them as they may
appear contrary to reason or unadapted to our local circumstances."
In Powell v. Brandon, 24 Miss. 343, the question was, whether
the rule in Slielleg's Case was a part of the law of Mississippi. In
their opinion, the court showed no hesitation in declaring that it, as
well as the whole body of the common law, was an integral part of
their system saying, "The argument has been frequently urged by
those who assign a feudal origin to the rule that inasmuch as the
feudal system has been abolished the reasoil for the rule has ceased,
and, therefore, the rule itself should be abrogated. However cogent
this argument may be when adidressed to the legislature, yet courts
of justice cannot so far recognise its policy as to make it the basis
of their decisions. Whenever a principle of the common law has
been once clearly and unquestionably recognised and established,
the courts of this country must enforce it, until it be repealed by
the legislature, as long as there is a subject-matter for the principle
to operate upon, and although the reason in the opinion of the court
which induced its original establishment may have ceased to exist.
This we conceive to be the established doctrine of the courts of this
country in every state where the principles of the common law
prevail. Were it otherwise the rules of law would be as fluctuating
and unsettled as the opinions of the different judges administering
them might happen to differ in relation to the existence of sufficient
and valid reasons for maintaining and upholding them." In Commonwealth v. Cturchill, 2 Mete. 123, all well-recognised maxims of the common law were declared to be a part of the law of
Massachusetts, the court saying, "It is conceded to be a maxim
of the common law applicable to the construction of statutes that
the simple repeal of the repealing law rot substituting other provisions in place of those repealed, revive the pre-existing law. As
a maxim of the common law it was in force here, when the constitution of the Commonwealth was adopted. By that constitution
it was declared that all the laws which have heretofore been adopted,
used and approved in the colony, province or state of Massachusetts Bay, and usually practised on in the court of law, shall still
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remain and be in full force until altered or repealed by the legislature. This constitution has been construed as adopting the great
body of the common law with those statutes made before the emigration of our ancestors which were made in amendment of the
common law, so far as these rules and principles were applicable to
our condition and form of government."
In Penny v. Little, 3
Scam. 301, Judge STEPHEN A. DOUGLASS recognised the landlord's
common-law right of distress as part of the law of Illinois, in a
case where the right to distrain was not expressly given in the
lease. His words are worthy of quotation. "The common law is
a beautiful system, containing the wisdom and experience of ages.
Like the people it ruled and protected, it was simple and crude in
its infancy and became enlarged, improved and polished as the
nation advanced in civilization, virtue and intelligence. Adapting
itself to the condition and circumstance of the peopl6, and relying
upon them for its administration, it necessarily improved as the
condition of the people was elevated. Is it to be presumed then
that our legislature, in adopting the common law of England, and
the British statutes in its aid, prior to the Fourth of James I.,
intended to exclude all the improvements in the common law since
that period ? If we are to be restricted to the common law as it
was enacted at 4 James I., rejecting all modifications and improvements which have since been made by practice and statutes, we will
find that system entirely inapplicable to our present condition, for
the simple reason that it is more than two hundred years old. The
reason why 4 James I. was adopted instead of the Declaration of
Independence was because that was the period of the establishment
of'the first colonial government, and with it the common law of
England as it then existed. From that period we must look to
American legislation and the reports of American courts for improvements and modifications in the common law."
Goodwin v. Thomp8on, 2 Greene (Iowa) 329, was an action to
recover damages from the defendant for aiding and abetting the
marriage of the plaintiff's minor daughter, a girl of the age of fourteen years. It appearing that there was no force, fraud or imposition used upon the girl, and that the marriage was her own voluntary at, it was held that the action could not be niaintained,
because, by the common law which was in force in Iowa, a female
of the age of twelve years could give her consent to. a marriage
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contract, and the later English statutes requiring the consent of
parents did not extend to this country.
Stout v. Keyes, 2 Doug. 184, was an action on the case by the
purchaser of a defeasible estate for the malicious cutting of timber
upon it by the defendant. It was admitted that such an action
could be maintained at common law, but it was contended for the
defendant that the common law was not in force in Michigan.
Upon this question the court said "This is a somewhat startling
proposition to be seriously urged at this time, when this court as
well as the Circuit Courts have been adjudicating common-law
actions upon common-law rules and principles since their organization under the state government, and also the territorial courts had
done so previously, from the organization of the territorial government under the Act of Congress in 1787." To the same effect is
Barlow v. Lambert, 28 Ala. 704, where the court said: "In
Gawood's Case, 2 Stewart 360, this court held that under the second article of the ordinance of 1787, which was afterwards made
the fundamental law of this territory, the common law of England
so far as applicable was made a rule of action for our government,
both in civil and criminal cases. By a series of decisions running
through our entire judicial history, the above doctrine has been
firmly established, and it must now be admitted that the common
law qualified as above is part of the law of this state."
I The lex mereatoria so far as incorporated into English law is
recognised by the American courts. If it were otherwise the law
relative to negotiable paper and the days of grace given for its pay..
ment would be thrown into indescribable confusion. This very
question of whether days of grace are to be allowed was raised and
fairly met in Cook v. Renic , 19 Ill. 598, where it was said, "The
allowance of days of grace is a part of the lex mercatoria, and the
real question to be considered is, whether that is a part of the common law and adopted with it, when the common law was adopted
in this state. The law merchant first originated in customs among
commercial men, who by common consent adopted such rules and
regulations as they found the wants and necessities of commerce
required, and as commerce was extended, it spread itself over the
kingdom till it became as universal as any principle of the common
law. At first the courts did not take judicial notice of it, but required proof to show what it was, when they would recognise and
enforce it. Soon after, however, it began to insinuate itself into
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the common law, by the courts taking judicial notice of it, till its
fibres became so intimately interwoven with the body of the common
law itself that no one could draw the line of demarcation between
the two, and the common law ever improving and adapting itself
to the requirements of commerce and the wants of the subject,
finally by progressive judicial decisions, the law merchant, or at
least that portion of it which was of universal application throughout the realm, was recognised lVy the courts without proof of its
existence, and from that time forth became absorbed by and really
constituted a part of the common law. The law-merchant then
being a part of the common law of England and being of a general
nature, and not local to that kingdom, is comprehended in that
clause of our statute which adopts the common law." In Piatt v.
.Eads; 1 Blackf. 82, a similar conclusion was reached.
The criminal law of England is the basis of the criminal law of
this country. In Fuller v. State, 1 Blackf. 66, it was held that
an indictment for murder could be maintained in Indiana at common law, as well as upon'their statute, and therefore that the fact of
the indictment concluding contraformam legis instead of contra forroam statuti was immaterial. In the same case the accused having
been convicted endeavored to obtain "the benefit of clergy." But
this claim was disposed of by the court in the following opinion:
"The benefit of clergy never was properly a common-law privilege. - It originated with that of sanctuary in the gloomy times of
popery. It was the offspring of that absurd and superstitious veneration for a privileged order in society, which unfortunately existed in those ages of darkness when the persons of clergymen
were considered sacred, and churchyards were viewed as consecrated
'ground. The statutes of England on the subject are local to that
kingdom. They were not made in and of the common law, and
are certainly not adopted as the laws of our country." This subject
early came under the attention of the Pennsylvania courts, and in
Shewell v. Fell, 3 Yeates 17, we find SEIPPEN, 0. J., saying,
"The common law and such of the statute laws of England as were
enacted before the settlement of the late province, applicable to our
local situation, have been adopted here both before and since the
Revolution. They form part of our code, under certain modifications sanctioned by the judicial authority. The English decisions,
however, do not universally comport with our circumstances. It is
the province of the court to judge in what cases the rules of the
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English common law should be relaxed. Should juries assume this
power, the necessary consequence would be, that the utmost uncertainty must ensue from the fluctuating opinions of different sets of
jurors in different countries."
A clearer comprehension of this branch of the subject, however,
may be obtained by the consideration of the cases in which certain
portions of the common law have been declared inapplicable to our
conditions of society or general circumstances. In Boyjer v. Sweet,
3 Scam. 120, book entries for goods sold and delivered, made by
the plaintiff who kept no clerk, were admitted in evidence to
charge the defendant, the court saying, "On the argument it was
urged by the counsel for the defendant that, inasmuch as we have
adopted the common law of England, we have adopted, likewise,
all its uses, and that resort must be had to the decisions of the
British courts to ascertain what is the rule in any given case
whcrein the legislature has not provided one. It is true, we have,
like most other states in the union, adopted the common law by
legislative act, but it must be understood only in cases where that
law is applicable to the habits and conditions of our society, and in
harmony with the genius, spirit and objects of our institutions.
Generally, too, the decisions of these courts furnish strong evidence of what the common law is, but it is equally true, that they
have made many innovations upon its original principles, and
refining upon the adjudications of one another, many of them have
become much modifed or wholly changed.
The courts of the
several states have also taken advantage of its pliant nature, in
which consists one of its greatest excellencies, and adapted it to
the ever varying exigencies of the country and to the ever
changing condition of society. Some rules of the common law,
suited to a highly refined and luxurious people, where every description of business is reduced to a system, and minute division of
labor exists, may be very ill adapted to a community differently
situated. There are some great leading principles, some fundamental rules which are never departed from, being founded in the
common reason of every man, and which no change of his condition can alter." The same conclusion was reached in Poultney v.
Ross, 1 Dall. 238. In Lindsley v. Coats, 1 Ohio 243, the question
was whether a good title to land could be.obtained by simple livery
of seisin as at common law, without any deed or written muniment of title, and the court said, "It has been repeatedly deter-
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mined by the courts of this state that they will adopt the principles
of the common law as the rules of decision, so far only as these
principles are adapted to our circumstances, state of society and
form of government. In no instance have the ancient commonlaw modes of conveyance, as such, been adopted in this state, and
long anterior to the settlement of this country they had given way
to the comparatively modern mode of assurance by deeds of lease
Upon the subject of what are to be considered asand release."
navigable rivers, the English rule that only those were to be
regarded as such in which the tide ebbed and flowed, was early
disregarded in the Pennsylvania cases, as inapplicable to the great
tideless streams which traverse vast extents of our territory:
Carson v. Blazer, 2 Binn. 475 ; Shrunk v. SChuylkill .Zav. Co.,
14 S. & R. 71. In 11forgan v. King, 30 Barb. 9, there is a learned
discussion of the same subject, the court holding that the Racket
river was navigable, saying, "The principles of the common law, as
its theory assumes, and its history proves, are not exclusively
applicable or suited to our country or condition of society; but on
the contrary, by reason of its property of expansibility and flexibility, their application to maly is practicable. The adoption
of the common law, in the most general terms by the government of any country, would not necessarily require or admit of an
unqualified application of all its rules without regard to local circumstances, however well settled and generally received these rules
might be. Its rules are modified upon its own principles, and not
in violation of them. When it is said that we have in this country
adopted the common law of Englahd, it is not meant that we have
adopted any mere formal rules or any written code, or the mere
verbiage in which the common law is expressed. It is aptly termed
the unwritten law of England, and we have adopted it as a constantly improving science, as an art or a system of legal logic,
rather than as a code of rules. In short, in adopting the common
law, we have adopted its fundamental principles and modes of
reasoning, and the substance of its rules as illustrated by the
reasons on which they are based, rather than by the mere words in
So, also, on the wide prairies of the
which they are expressed."
West, the reason of the English rule that every owner of cattle is
bound to keep them fenced in upon his own premises, was deemed
to have ceased. . The rule was, therefore, abandoned, and the doctrine enunciated, that if one desired to protect his crops from tres-
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passing cattle, he must separate his field from the prairie where
the cattle grazed at large. In Wagner v. 'Bissell, 3 Iowa 396,
the court, after admitting that at common law the principle was
well settled, said, " We are then led to inquire whether independent
of any statutory provision, this rule is applicable to our condition
and circumstances as a people, and if it is, then whether it has or
has not been changed by legislative action. Unlike many of the
states we have no statute declaring in express terms the common
law to be in force in this state. That it is, however,.has been frequently decided by this court, and does not, perhaps, admit of
controversy. But while this is true, it must be nnderstood, that it
is adopted only so far as it is applicable to us as a people, and may
be of a general nature." The reason of the inapplicability of the
English rule is thus stated in Seeley v. Peters, 5 Gilman 150,
" Admittiig that at common law the owner of a close was not
bound to fence against the adjoining close except by force of prescription, yet, in adopting the common law it must be understood
only in cases where that law is applicable to the habits and condition of our society, and in harmony with the genius, spirit and
objects of our institutions. However well the rule of the common
law may be suited to a densely populated country like England, it
is surely but ill-adapted to a new country like ours. The wide
prairies and scarcity of timber are a sufficient reason for the nonexistence of this rule. He who desires to protect his crops must
fence them in himself." In Norris v. Harris,15 Cal. 226, it was
argued that, though the common law was incorporated into the
common law of the original colonies, it was not part of the law of
the western states. 'Mr. Justice FIELD (now of the Supreme Court
of the United States), conclusively sets at rest this doubt in his
opinion, saving, "There is no doubt that the common law is the
basis of the laws of those states which were originally colonies of
England, or carved out of such colonies. It was imported by the
colonists and established so far as it was applicable to their institutions and circumstances, and was claimed by the Congress of the
United Colonies in 1774 as a branch of those indubitable rights
and liberties to which the respective colonies were entitled. In
all the states thus having a common origin formed from colonies
which constituted a part of the same empire, and which recognised
the common law as the source of their jurisprudence, it must be
presumed that such common law exists.. A similar presumption
VoL. XXX.-71
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must prevail as to the existence of the common law in those states
which have been established in territory acquired since the Revolution, where such territory was not at the time of its acquisition
occupied by an organized and civilized community, where, in fact,
the population of the new state upon the establishment of government was formed by emigration from the original states. As in
British colonies established in uncultivated regions by emigration
from the parent country, the subjects are considered as carrying
with them the common law so far as it is. applicable to their new
situation. So, when American citizens emigrate into territory
which is unoccupied by civilized man, and commence the formation of a new government, they are equally considered as carrying
with them so much of the same common law in its modified and
improved condition under the influence of modern civilization and
republican principles, as is suited to their new condition and wants.
But no such presumption can apply to states in which a government already existed at the time of their accession to the country,
as Florida, Louisiana and Texas. They had already laws of their
own, which remained in force until, by the proper authority, they
were abrogated and new laws were promulgated. With them there
is no more presumption of the existence of the common law than
of any other law."
But though the jurisprudence of England, as administered
through common-law forms, has been incorporated into the body
of the American law without much dispute, the remedies enforced
in the ecclesiastical courts were not so willingly accepted as within
the jurisdiction of our purely secular courts, in a country where
matters ecclesiastical are left entirely to church judicatories independent of the state. If, however, all these matters which in
England at the time of the settlement of the American colonies
were solely oognisable in the courts ecclesiastical, are not within
the jurisdiction of our courts, many most flagrant civil injuries
would be without a remedy. For in England, many matters purely
civil in their nature are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
ecclesiastical courts. For example, all cases arising out of the
contract of marriage, in consequence of the old view that this
relation was of a purely religious character, were only cognisable
in courts presided over by ecclesiastics. In America, where the
contract of marriage is purely a civil contract, and where -no
ecclesiastical courts exist to take cognisance of such cases, breaches
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of marital rights would be remediless if the ordinary civil courts
had not jurisdiction of such causes. In many of the states, statutory enactments incorporating in extenso the main provisions of
the English law, and designating the proper courts for the exercise
of this jurisdiction, have removed all difficulty and confusion from
the subject. But apart from these statutes, it has been decided
that our civil courts have jurisdiction of cases in which rights of
person or property are involved, which in England are solely
within the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical courts. In Short v.
Stotts, 58 Ind. 29, there is a very interesting discussion of the
struggle which took place in England between the courts of common law and the ecclesiastical courts for jurisdiction over cases
arising out of the contract of marriage. The action was one for
damages for breach of promise to marry. The defendant denied
that the courts of common law in Indiana could take cognisance
of such an action. His position, as stated in the opinion of the
court, is as follows: "The only law governing this state is: 1.
The Constitution of the United States and of this state; 2. All
statutes of the General Assembly of the state in force and not inconsistent with such constitutions; 3. All statutes of the United
States in force and relating to subjects over which Congress has power
to legislate for the states and not inconsistent with the Constitution
of the U. S. - 4. The common law of England and statutes of the
British Parliament made in aid thereof prior to the fourth year of
the reign of James I., which are of a general nature and not local to
that kingdom, * * * that as the sources of our law are as above
stated, and as neither the common law of England nor any statute
made in aid thereof prior to the period mentioned (1607), authorized
such action, it follows we have no law which authorizes the action
* * * that prior to the year 1607, the contract for marriage was
one exclusively of ecclesiastical and not of common-law jurisdiction, and that prior to that time, no action had been maintained in
a common-law court for the breach of such contract." The court,
in a very carefully considered opinion, sustain their jurisdiction
over this action upon the ground that though prior to 1607 no
case can be found in English common-law courts where the action
was maintained, yet that by the principles of. the common law
which existed long anterior to 1607, an action for the breach of
contract for marriage will'lie. In Crump v. Morgan, 3 Ired. Eq. 91,
there is a very elaborate and learned discussion of the question
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whether a court of equity, without statutory authority, could
declare void the marriage of a. female lunatic, which had been procured in order that the husband might obtain possession of her
large estate. The decisions'of English ecclesiastical courts having
been cited in support of the jurisdiction, it was argued that they
had no force in American civil courts. The court unhesitatingly
disposed of the objection to the jurisdiction, saying : " It is said that
these are the adjudications of ecclesiastical courts and are founded
not in the common law, but in the canon and civil laws, and therefore not entitled to respect here. But it is an entire mistake to
say "thatthe canon and civil laws, as administered in the ecclesiastical courts of England, are not part of the common law. Blackstone, following Lord HALE, classes them among the unwritten
laws of England, and as parts of the common law which by custom are adopted and used in peculiar jurisdictions. They were
brought herd by our ancestors as parts of the common law and
have been adopted and used here in all cases to which they were
applicable, and whenever there has been a tribunal exercising a
jurisdiction to call for their use. They govern testamentary cases
and matrimonial cases. Probate and re-probate of will stand upon
the same grounds here as in England, unless so far as statutes
may have altered it :" Wightman v. Wightman, 4 Johns. Oh. 343,
repeated the same doctrine, and held further that where by statute
jurisdiction is given to any particular court over matters either
matrimonial or testamentary, the English law is still to be consulted as a guide in matters relating to the general subject, for
which particular provision is not made in the statute. To the same
effect is Williamson v. Williamson, 1 Johns. Oh. 489, where upon
a libel for divorce for adultery, the question was whether the facts
having been proved, the granting of a final decree dissolving the
marriage was within the sound discretion of the court. The same
learned judge said : "The statute says that after the truth of the
adultery charged has been ascertained, 'it shall be lawful for the
court to decree a dissolution of the marriage.' This language may
and ought to be understood as leaving to the court the exercise of
that sound discretion which the nature of the case and the principles of equity might require. The general rules of the English
jurisprudence on this subject must be considered as applicable
under the regulations of the statute to this newly-created branch
of equity jurisdiction." This doctrine is still more strikingly ex-
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emplified in LeBarron v. LeBarron, 35 Vt. 365, where in a proceeding for divorce by the wife for the alleged impotence of the
husband, the petitioner asked for a physical examination of the
respondent by medical experts. The application was resisted
upon the ground that the statutes relating to divorce contained no
provision for such an examination, but the court granted the application, POLAND, 0. J., saying: " To enable us to determine this
question, it becomes necessary to examine into the real source and
extent of the jurisdiction of the court over this subject. The
legal power to annul marriages has been recognised as existing in
England from a very early period, but its administration, instead
of being committed to the common-law courts, was exercised by
their spiritual or ecclesiastical courts. Under the administration
of these 'courts for a long period of time, the principles and
practice governing this head of their jurisdiction ripened into a
settled course and. body of jurisprudence, like that of the courts
of. chancery and admiralty, and constituted with these systems a
part of the general law of tle realm, and in the broad and enlarged'
use of the term, a part of the common law of the land. This
country having been settled by colonies from England under the
general authority of the government, and remaining for many
years a part of its dominion, became and remained subject and
entitled to the general laws of the government, and they became
equally the laws of this country, except so far as they were inapplicable to the new relation and condition of things. This we
understand to be well settled, both by judicial decision and the
authority of eminent law writers. But if this were not so, the
adoption of the common law of England by the legislature of the
state was an adoption of the whole body of the law of that country,
aside from their parliamentary legislation, and included those
principles of law administered by the courts of chancery and admiralty, and the ecclesiastical courts (so far as the same were
applicable to our local situation and circumstances and not repugnant to our constitution and laws), as well as that portion of their
laws administered by the ordinary and common tribunals. As the
jurisdiction in cases matrimonial in England was exclusively committed to the spiritual courts, and had never been exercised by
the ordinary law courts, the same could not be exercised by the
courts of law in this country until it was vested in them by the
law-making power. As we have never had any ecclesiastical
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courts in this country who could execute this branch of the law, it
was in abeyance until some tribunal was properly clothed with
jurisdiction over it or vested in the legislature. It was probably
on this ground that the legislatures of the states proceeded in
granting divorces as many of them did in former times. When
the legislature establish a tribunal to exercise this jurisdiction or
invest it in any of the already established courts, such tribunal
hecomes entitled, and it is their duty to exercise it according to
the general principles of the common law of the subject and the
practice of the English courts so .far as they *aresuited to our conditi'on and the general spirit of our laws." The order for physical examination was granted. Similar orders ipon similar grounds
were granted in Newell v. Newell, 9 Paige 25, and in -Devanbagh
*v. -Devanbagh,5 Id.554.
It must be noticed, however, that in the federal courts a different rule has been adopted relating to criminal.offences from that
adopted in the state courts. In such matters the jurisdiction rests
entirely upon the Constitution of the United States and Acts of
Congress. This was early declared -in The United States v. Worrall, 2 Dall. 384, where Justice CHASE said: "It is attempted,
however, to supply the silence of the Constitution and statutes ofl
the Union by resorting to the common law for a definition and
"punishment of the offence which has been committed. But in my
opinion the United States, as a federal government, have no common law, and consequently no indictment can be maintained in their
courts for offences merely at the common law. If, indeed, the
United States can be supposed for a moment to have a common
law, it must, I presume, be that of England, and yet it is impossible to trace when or how the system was adopted or introduced.
With respect to the individual states, the difficulty does not occur.
When the American colonies were first settled by our ancestors, it
was held, as well by the settlers as by the judges and lawyers of
Englund, that they brought hither, as a birthright and inheritance,
so much of the common law as was applicable to their local situation and change of circumstances. But each colony judged for
itself what parts of the common law were applicable to its new
condition, and in various modes, by legislative acts, by judicial
decisions, or by constant usage, adopted some parts and rejected
others. Hence, he who shall travel through the different states
will soon discover that the whole of the common law of England
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has been nowhere introduced; that some states have rejected what
others have adopted, and that there is, in short, a great and essential diversity in the subjects to which the common law is applied
as well as in the extent of its application." This conclusio that
there is no federal common law in criminal cases has been followed
in numerous case to be found in the federal reports, the proper
consideration of which would require a separate article.
Another important question is, how far are British statutes,
passed before the settlement of this country, to be recognised as
part of our common law. This subject was most carefully considered by the judges of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in
1807, whose report is found in the appendix to 3 Binney. Of
this report Mr. Binney says: "In many respects it deserves to be
placed by the side of judicial decisions, being the result of very
great research and deliberation by the judges, and of their united
opinion. It may not, perhaps, be considered as authoritative as
judicial precedent, but it approaches so nearly to it that a safer
guide in practice or a more respectable, not to say decisive, authority
in argument cannot be wanted by the profession." In this report
this general principle was stated, that such English statutes passed
before the settlement of the colony as were applicable to the emigrants in their new situation were in force, but such statutes as
related to the king's prerogative, the rights and privileges of the
nobility and clergy, the local commerce and revenue of England,
and other subjects unnecessary to enumerate, were improper to be
extended to Pennsylvania. With respect to statutes enacted since
the settlement of Pennsylvania, it was assumed as a principle that
they do not extend here, unless they have been recognised by an
Act of Asse-nibly, or adopted by long continued practice in courts
of justice. Of the latter description, there are very few, and those,
it is supposed, were introduced from a sense of their evident utility.
As English statutes they had no obligatory force, but from long
practice they may be considered as incorporated with the law of
our country. A similar report was prepared in Maryland by
Chancellor KILBY in 1794. In Massachusetts the question
was raised in Sackett.v. Sackett, 8 Pick. .09, whether- the Statute
of Gloucester, 6 Edw. I., c. 5, giving an action of waste against ten
ants for life was in force in that state, or to be considered part of
the common law of the land. PARKER, C. J., said: " Our ancestors came to this country, bringing with them, as all agree, the
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rights and privileges of Englishmen and the common law of that
country, so far as it should be found applicable to their new state
and condition. They brought with them also a charter containing
power to make such new laws as their exigencies might require.
They could live under the old law or make new ones. Whenever
they legislated upon any subject their own law regulated them;
when they did not legislate, the law they brought with them was
the rule of conduct. Then the question is, whether the law by
which they would be governed in relation to waste committed by
tenants was the ancient common law as it stood before the Statute'
of Mlarlebridge, or as modified by that statute, or the law which
was in force in England at the time of their emigration, and for
centuries before, and we think it very clear that it was the latter,
it would seem exceedingly strange that their coming over to this
country should operate as a iepeal of either of these ancient
statutes, so as to reinstate the law as it existed in the time
of Henry III., which had been abrogated three or four centuries and was found inconvenient in the reign of that prince."
The same doctrine was declared in Bruce v. Wood, I Mete. 542,
where the court said, the Statute of 32 Henry VIII., c. 28, which
gives the wife and her heirs a right of entry after the decease of
her husband, having been passed before the emigration of our
ancestors, must be taken to be a modification and amendment of
the common law in force here. But all British statutes which are
in conflict with our Constitution and laws, or with the general
spirit of our institutions, are unhesitatingly disregarded by the
American courts whenever any right is claimed dependent upon
them. Such was the Statute of 9 George I., commonly known as
the "Black Act," for the suppression of poaching. In Atate v.
Campbell, T. U. P. Charlton 666, the Supreme Court of Georgia
said: "That statute never could have been in force, because it, as
is discoverable from the preamble and the context, is founded upon
a tender solicitude for the amusement and property of the aristocracy of England. It was made to protect from the violation
or profanation of the people the forest of his majesty or the park
of the peer. How then could it apply to a country which was
but one extended forest, in which the liberty of killing a deer or
cutting down a tree was as unrestrained as the natural rights of
the deer to rove or the tree to grow. In this view of the statute
there was nothing left for its provisions to operate upon in this
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state. It was therefore a local statute, fit only for the internal
polity of England."
It hhis been argued in some of the western states that whatever
recognition may be given to British statutes in the states which
have grown out of the original colonies, no place should be given
to them in the virgin jurisprudence of the west. But this contention met with proper reprobation in Hamilton v. Kneeland, 1
Nevada 40, the court saying: "The rule of the commof law that
a condition cannot be reserved to any but the grantor and his heirs,
I think has never been recognised as the law in this country, and
it was completely overturned in England by the Statute 32 Henry
VIII., c. 34, and in adopting the common law of England in this
country it seems to be the established doctrine that it is adopted
as amended or altered by English statutes in force at the time of
the.emigration of our colonial ancestors. But counsel argue that
this doctrine embraces only the original states. The authorities
recognise no such limitation, and upon principle there ought to be
none. When the common law of England, consisting in part of
statutes, as we have shown, has been adopted in the United States,
why may not' Americans, like the adventurous emigrants of other
nationalities, carry with them the common law of their country into
the territories acquired since the Revolution ?"
The territorial legislature of Iowa, by the Act of 1840, provided
that none of the statutes of Great Britain should be in force as
part of the law of the territory, but in O'Parrallv. Simplot, 4
Iowa 381, this was interpreted so as only to apply to statutes of
the United Kingdom, passed since the union with Scotland at the
accession of James I. This period coincides very nearly with the
date fixed by the constitutions and codes of many of the states, at
which the country is reckoned to have been 'settled, and when the
common law was transplanted from British to American soil.
Nearly all the states which were formed out of what was formerly
known as the Northwest Territory have fixed upon 4 James I.,
A. D. 1607, the year of the founding of Jamestown. The selection
was natural, in view of the former intimate relations existing
between Virginia and the Northwest Territory. Of course, the
original colonies each take the date of their own settlement. But
in Coburn v. Harvey, 18 Wis. 147, the year of our independence
is taken as the date. This exceptional doctrine is justified upon
the following grounds, stated in the opinion of the court: "The
VOL. =X.-72
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Revolution, in the case of the western states, should be taken as
the time of the emigration of our ancestors from whence the statutes work. Chancellor KENT states that it is the established
doctrine that English statutes passed before the emigration of our
ancestors in amendment of the law constituted a part of the common law of this country. The phrase 'emigration of our ancestors' is too indefinite to establish any fixed time which excluded
subsequeht English statutes from being considered a part of the
common law of some at least of the colonies. For our ancestors
did not all emigrate, nor were the colonies all established at any
one time. And the reason given for adopting the common law
with all the statutes amending it prior to*a certain time, and
excluding statutes passed afterwards unless expressly adopted,
precludes the idea of fixing the same time for all the colonies. It
is very obvious that in applying the general principle each colony
would fix the beginning of its colonial existence as the dividing line between those English statutes which were and those
which were not a part of its common law, and we have come
to the conclusion that in applying the general rule to a state
which like this had no political existence before the Revolution, it must, in harmony with the reasoning of these cases,
be held that when our territorial legislature and the framers of
our Constitution recognised the existence here of the common law,
they must be held to have had reference to that law as it existed,
modified and amended by English statutes passed prior to the
Revolution. As before shown, there was no one time applicable
to all the colonies, and there is no reason to assume that we should
adopt the commencement of one colony rather than another as the
time applicable to us. The Revolution itself is the dividing line
which the reasoning of these cases would suggest for us."
A judicial discussion of this question, however, has become unnecessary in most of the states organized since the Revolution, by the
statutory provision before mentioned, fixing the year 1607 as the
date. The jurisprudence of some of the western states can never
be properly understood by one unmindful of their early settlement
by non-English speaking nations. Therefore over a great portion
of the Northwestern Territory, as well as the trans-Mississippi territories, the French or Spanish laws prevailed. Upon, however,
the acquisition of these various territories, by statutory enactment,
the former law was abolished and the common law substituted.

.
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This is admitted in Lyiman v. Bennett, 8 Mich. 18, where the
court said: "It is undoubtedly true that at one time the Custom
of Paris was in force here. It was expressly abrogated by the
territorial legislature in 1810, and probably applied to very few
cases then, if to any. Practically the common law has prevailed
here in ordinary matters since our government took possession,
and the countr'y has grown up under it. How or by what particular means it originated would open an inquiry more curious
than useful. A custom which is as old as the American settlements, and has been universally recognised by every department
of government, has made it the law of the land if not made so otherwise. Our statutes, without this substratum, would not only fail to
provide for the great mass of affairs, but would lack the means of
safe construction. We are of opinion that questions of property
not clearly excepted from it must be determined by the common
law, modified only by such circuniistances as render it inapplicable
to our local affairs." And in Beaume v. Chambers, 22 Mo. 36, it
was said: "1Prior to 1816 the Spanish law was the law of
Missouri, then the common law was introduced by statute. After
the introduction of the common law, the Spanish law no longer had
any existence here. It has only been regarded in the interpretation of contracts which had been made before its abrogation, and
on the adjustment of rights which had accrued prior to the introduction of the common law, just as we would look at this day to
the laws of Spain in interpreting a contract which bad been made
in that kingdom." It must be always borne in mind, however,
that the law of Louisiana is an exception to the general rule, and
that the civil law introduced by the early settlers still remains the
basis of the jurisprudence of that state.
The various courts of this country are constantly called upon to
settle controversies whose determination is dependent upon the law
of sister states. In such cases either party is at liberty to produce
evidence of the law of another state upon any given subject by the
oral testimony or deposition of those skilled in the profession; but
in the absence of such testimony, it is important to notice that the
presumption is that the common law exists in a sister state in the
condition it was at the settlement of that state: Thurston v. Percival, I Pick. 415; Brown v. Pratt, 3 Jones, N. 0. Eq. 202;
Inge v. Murphy, 10 Ala. 885; High's Appeal, 2 Doug. 515;
•Shepherd v. XL'abors, 6 Ala. 631; Crouch v. Hall, 15 Ill. 263.
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It may be worth while to notice that this statement of the law
differs from that sometimes made, that, in the absence of proof, the
law of sister states will be presumed to be the same as the law of
the forum. This is not so, because the common law of the forum
may have been altered by tatute, and there is no presumption that
other states have passed statutes similar to those passed by the legislature of the state in which the action is brought: The true presumption is, that in the absence of proof to the contrary, the
common law exists unaltered in a sister state.
But though the common law has been incorporated into the
general system of our laws, it is within the power of the legislature
to alter or amend it at their discretion. A contention to the contrary was disposed of in .Noonanv. State, 1 Smedes & Marshall 562.
" That the common law, like the common atmosphere around every
living being, is gladly received by all framers of government, is
certainly very true, but that it was adopted to remain perpetual,
unaltered and unalterable, and not to be tempered to our habits,
wants and customs, we conceive was never designed by the wisdom
of those who established our fundamental law." The following
quotation from the opinion of the court in lMarks v. Norris, 4
Hen. & Munf. 465, may not be out of place as a concluding
paragraph. "While I have not less respect for English judges
and English opinions than other gentlemen, yet I have too much
regard for myself, and the national character of my country, to
rely upon English books further than for information merely, but
not as authority; it was the common law we adopted and not
English decisions, and we should take the standard of that law,
namely, that we should live honestly, should hurt nobody, and
should render to every one his due, for our judicial guide."
The following extracts from the codes of several of the states
-have an immediate bearing upon the subject under discussion:
Arkansas: Rev. Stat. 1874, sect. 772. "The common law of
England, so far as the same is applicable and of a general nature,
and all statutes of the British Parliament, in aid of or to supply
the defects of the common law, made prior to the fourth year of
James I., that are applicable to our form of government, of a
general nature, and not local to -that kingdom, and not indonsistent
with the Constitution and laws of the United States, or the constitution and laws of this state, shall be the rule of decision in this
state unless altered or repealed by the General Assembly of this
state."
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California: Act of April 13th 1850, Gen. Laws, p. 599. "The
common law of England, so far as it is not repugnant to or inconsistent with the Constitution of the United States, or the Constitution or laws of the state of California, shall be the rule of decision
in all the courts 6f this state."
Illinois : Rev. Stat. 1874, ch 28, sect. 1. "That the common
law of England, so far as the same is applicable and of a general
nature, and all statutes or acts of the British Parliament made in
aid of or to supply the defects of the common law prior to the
fourth year of James I., excepting the second 'section of the sixth
chapter of 43 Elizabeth, the eighth chapter of 13 Elizabeth, and
the ninth chapter of 37 Henry VIII., and which are of a general
nature and not local to that kingdom, shall be the rule of decision,
and shall be considered as of full force until repealed by legislative
authority."
Indiana: Act of 31st May 1852, is in the same words as the
Illinois act, supra.
Kansas : Rev. Stat. 1868, ch. 119, sect. 3. "The common law,
as modified by constitutional and sfatutory law, judicial decisions
and the condition and wants of the people shall remain in force in
aid of the general statutes of the state."
Missouri: Rev. Stat. 1870, ch. 86, sect. 1. "The common law of
England and all statutes and Acts of Parliament made prior to the
fourth year of the reign of James I., and which are of a general
nature not local to that kingdom, which common law and statutes
are not repugnant to or inconsistent with the Constitution of the
United States, the Constitution of this state, or the statute laws in
force for the time being, shall be the rule of action and decision in
this state, any law, custom or usage to the contrary notwithstanding."
Nebraska: Rev. Stat. 1873, sect. 1. "1So much of the common
law of England as is applicable and not inconsistent with the Constitution of the United States, the constitution of this state or with
any law passed or to be passed by the legislature thereof is adopted
and declared to be the law within this state."
North Carolina: Code 1855, ch. 22. "All such parts of the common law as were heretofore in force and use within this state, or so
much of the common law as is not destructive of or repugnant to,
or inconsistent with, the freedom and independence of this state
and the form of government therein established, and which has not

